FROM BRICKLAYER TO BRICKLAYER: THE RHODE ISLAND ROOTS OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN E. FOGARTY'S IRISH-AMERICAN NATIONALISM

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The post World War II years were not an auspicious time for an effort to enlist American support for opposition to the partition of Ireland. Many Americans, especially members of the Administration, had considered Irish neutrality in the world-wide conflict to be little better than active enmity. Conversely, the 'Special Relationship' with Great Britain had grown much deeper during the war.¹ World War II also raised the temperature under the melting pot, dulling ethnic consciousness to a considerable degree.²

Nor did the transition to the Cold War improve the prospects for securing American support for a united Ireland. With the polarization of the Cold War years, the Anglo-American alliance would become a cornerstone of western defense.³ The Irish question paled before the numerous other matters which were competing for foreign policy attention. On the domestic front, the tense atmosphere of the Cold War period put a premium on American
nationalistic fervor and correspondingly decreased ethnic awareness. Sociological processes - including the baby boom, increased access to higher education, and suburbanization - further loosened ethnic cohesiveness and decreased the receptivity of Irish-Americans to the call of the homeland.4

Despite these formidable obstacles, a hard core of Irish-American nationalists did attempt to enlist American support for ending the partition of Ireland. Their activities focused largely on the efforts of Congressman John E. Fogarty of Rhode Island to get the United States House of Representatives to go on record as being in favor of a united Ireland.

John E. Fogarty was elected to the House of Representatives from Rhode Island's second congressional district in 1940. Only 27 years old when he was first elected, he would hold that office until his death in 1967. Although known primarily as an outspoken supporter of labor at the start of his tenure, Fogarty's greatest influence would be felt in the area of medical care. His skillful handling of the chairmanship of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Health, Education, and Welfare was in large part responsible for the massive increase in government funding for medical research in the 1950's and 1960's. Indeed his tireless efforts in promoting government support for such research earned Fogarty the title of "Mr. Public Health."5
As one Rhode Island historian has noted, however, the Congressman from Rhode Island was "equally renowned as an unrelenting supporter of Irish reunification." Fogarty was intensely proud of his own Irish heritage, as was evidenced by his omnipresent campaign symbol which earned him the moniker "the man in the green bow tie." Indeed Fogarty's election in 1940 ensured that Ireland would find an American congressman who was acutely sensitive to issues involving the land of his forebears.

Fogarty's pro-Irish proclivities were most evident in his efforts to bring American pressure to bear against the continued partition of Ireland. From his first days in Congress he was a vocal critic of the existence of the border. In the early 1940's Fogarty had supported Ireland's neutrality in World War II, based largely on the continued British occupation of Northern Ireland. His opposition to partition became more formalized in 1949 when, in response to an anti-partition campaign launched by the Irish government, he first introduced a bill in Congress which became known as the Fogarty Resolution. This bill called for the House of Representatives to express its sentiments that partition should be abolished unless an all-Ireland plebiscite on the issue determined otherwise. Paul O'Dwyer, an Irish-American leader active in the anti-partition movement, characterized the bill as "a resolution in the best Irish revolutionary tradition."
House leaders, however, initially refused to allow a hearing on the Fogarty Resolution. Administration leaders feared an open discussion of the partition problem at any level of government. Great Britain was the United State's principal ally in the Cold War, and was slated to play a pivotal role in the American-aided reconstruction of Western Europe's defenses. The Administration considered Ireland to be within the British sphere of influence, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson feared that any American involvement in the Irish partition question "would be resented in England and...would cause far more harm than it could possibly do good." Even after Ireland dissolved all official ties with Great Britain with the declaration of the Republic of Ireland in 1949, the United States Administration continued to view U.S.-Ireland relations through the prism of U.S.-United Kingdom relations. It became formal State Department policy to "make it clear at all times that Ireland's relations with the United States...can form no substitute for healthy relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom." Thus the United States government refused to participate in the partition debate primarily because it feared that to do so would damage relations with Great Britain. While the strength of the 'Special Relationship' between Great Britain and the United States waxed and waned during the postwar years, it was always 'special enough' to preclude any official mention of conditions in Northern Ireland by the United States government.
Perhaps another reason why the Administration was so adamant in downplaying the partition issue was its reticence to draw attention to conditions in Northern Ireland. The United States government had seized the moral high ground in Cold War rhetoric against undemocratic conditions in Communist countries throughout the world. In Northern Ireland, the Catholic minority suffered from the effects of gerrymandering, franchise restrictions, and religious and economic discrimination.¹⁴ That Great Britain, America's primary Cold War ally, would allow such practices to continue within the United Kingdom could only sully the image of the Western Alliance.

Irish-American nationalists, however, demanded that the United States government apply the same standards of behavior to its allies as to its enemies. Fogarty decried "the use of undemocratic processes in the conduct of local elections" in Northern Ireland, and complained that "[i]t is pointless to denounce Russia for her conquest of...nations in the East, while Great Britain sets the same example in her continued dominance of her closest neighbor, Ireland."¹⁵ Yet the Administration refused to consider conditions in Northern Ireland as a moral issue worthy of its attention. Official State Department policy was to "avoid being drawn into discussions of the rights and wrongs of such issues and demonstrate by words and actions our neutrality on the partition question."¹⁶ Accordingly, the State Department advised against passage of the Fogarty
Resolution. In the face of such official opposition, the Fogarty Resolution remained buried in committee.

Irish-American nationalists, however, refused to acquiesce in the Administration's deliberate inertia on the matter. Fogarty forced the issue on March 29, 1950, when he offered an amendment to the Marshall Plan Foreign Aid Bill which called for "withholding any assistance under this act, where it appears that any participating country is impairing, in whole or in part, its economic recovery by reason of the expenditure of any portion of its funds, commodities, or services in the maintenance or subsidization of any dependent country which naturally is, or should be, an integral part of some other participating country, until such time as such participating country shall sever its control of, and refrain further from maintaining or subsidizing such dependent country." While the amendment itself mentioned no specific country at which it was aimed, Fogarty, in his argument in support of his amendment, explicitly named its intended target. "In plain English," he argued, "it means that all funds that shall be appropriated through the authorization of this bill will be withheld from the United Kingdom as long as partition exists in Ireland." Fogarty complained that since the British government was subsidizing the Government of Northern Ireland despite its undemocratic practices, the United States, by its economic support of Great Britain, was indirectly helping to bolster partition. He noted that it
was costing Great Britain approximately $150 million dollars a year to subsidize Northern Ireland, and plaintively asked "[w]hy should we...be appropriating this fiscal year of 1950, about a billion dollars in grants to the United Kingdom, while at the same time, directly or indirectly, it is costing Great Britain $150,000,000 a year to subsidize that portion of Ireland."\textsuperscript{20} To the surprise and consternation of the Administration, Fogarty succeeded in persuading a reduced House to pass his amendment on a preliminary vote, 99 to 66.\textsuperscript{21}

Devout Irish nationalist that he was, Fogarty was no doubt elated by the vote. As one congressional colleague later noted of the Congressman from Rhode Island, "[f]or one night he enjoyed the satisfaction of knowing that the House of Representatives had cut off all aid to England."\textsuperscript{22} Fogarty denied that he intended Great Britain any harm by the amendment. He also denied any intention to harm the Marshall Plan. "I do not think we are going to hurt this bill a bit if this amendment is adopted," he optimistically reasoned, "because if it is adopted I am sure that within 24 hours the Parliament in England will vote to allow all of Ireland to participate in a special election to determine for themselves their own type of government."\textsuperscript{23}

Despite its initial success, however, the vote suspending ECA funds from Great Britain was reversed by the full House on a standing vote two days later.\textsuperscript{24} Fogarty was not overly dismayed by the turn of events. "I made my
point," he declared, "by bringing the situation of a
partitioned Ireland to light all over the world."25 Paul
O'Dwyer later concurred with Fogarty's assessment of the
impact of his amendment, noting that "the newspaper accounts
pointed out that there was a serious denial of civil
liberties to the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland."26

Indeed, as a result of the Fogarty amendment, the debate
over the partition of Ireland - a situation that the State
Department had tried to de-emphasize - was suddenly, if
momentarily, vaulted onto the front page of most major
newspapers.

Not all of the publicity resulting from the Fogarty
amendment, however, redounded to its sponsor's credit.
While the front pages of the press ran stories about
conditions in Northern Ireland, the editorial pages were
filled with denunciations of Fogarty and his maneuver. He
and his colleagues were excoriated by the press for
endangering relations with Great Britain. Most editors
argued that threatening the Marshall Aid funds of the
financially prostrate Great Britain posed dire ramifications
for European recovery. The Providence Journal labelled the
vote on the Fogarty amendment an "irresponsible rampage" and
declared that "were England denied Marshall Plan aid, its
economy would collapse and that collapse would bring down
the nations of free Western Europe and spread its effects
throughout Asia and Africa."27 In a similar vein, the New
York Times called the vote on the amendment an
"irresponsible action which can only ... impair the confidence of our allies in the consistency of our foreign policy."28 The same editorial warned that "[w]hatever satisfaction there may be in Ireland...the real rejoicing...will be in Moscow."29

The press naturally ascribed a political motivation for Fogarty's maneuver, and he was reproached for trading American security for political popularity. The Providence Journal charged that "Congressman Fogarty has played politics for votes with the vital interests of his country."30 Although the Fogarty Amendment naturally found favor in Irish-American circles, overall, when viewed in the context of heightened Cold War tensions, it was not a popular political move.

Publicity and political popularity, however, were not the only motivations behind the Fogarty amendment. In Fogarty's view, the original creation of Northern Ireland had been the result of one massive gerrymander. At a time when the United States government was taking the lead in protesting against violations of freedom and democracy by communist governments throughout the world, Fogarty called for the government to apply the same standard to its allies as to its enemies. He inveighed against Great Britain's support of the Northern Ireland state - where gerrymandering, franchise restrictions, and religious and economic discrimination were all practiced against the Catholic minority. Fogarty complained that he was forced to
"blush for his country" when the nation's leaders in Washington, especially men from the State Department, told him that partition was "none of our business", and that it was a problem which Great Britain and Ireland can settle. Fogarty's amendment to the Marshall Plan funds was a signal to the Administration and congressional leaders that he was frustrated at their refusal to allow even a hearing on his and other similar resolutions.

Ironically, the same Cold War tensions that contributed to Fogarty's lambasting by the press also helped to ensure that his amendment would have an effect beyond that of just a publicity stunt. Fogarty had no intention of crippling the Marshall Plan but, in the tense Cold War year of 1950, his maneuver proved unsettling to government leaders. It created sufficient doubt in the minds of Administration and congressional leaders that - after his amendment passed and in order to ensure its reversal - the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, John Kee, acceded to hold hearings regarding the Fogarty Resolution.

The hearing was held on April 28, 1950. In Kee's absence, Representative Mike Mansfield, who was sympathetic to the intent of the resolution, presided. Over one hundred people testified before the committee, and all voiced support for the Fogarty Resolution. The government apparently hoped that the hearing itself would satisfy Irish-American nationalists and would serve as a safety valve through which they could vent their frustrations. No
action followed on the Fogarty Resolution. The outbreak of the Korean War then diverted the attention of even the most vociferous of Irish nationalists.

Yet by late 1950, Fogarty was again voicing his impatience at the lack of action on his resolution. He demanded that the House move on his resolution. Referring to America's moral leadership in world affairs in light of the Korean conflict, Fogarty complained that "[w]e cannot honestly claim to be the champion of small nations to be free, and yet refuse to face the facts as they exist in Ireland." Fogarty continued to try to focus attention on the plight of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, expressing his belief that "only when the country has been re-united will all the people of the northeast be freed from disfranchisement, racial and religious discrimination, denial of their civil rights and the evils of gerrymandering and a despotic domestic government which is even alien to British custom and tradition."

In February of 1951 Fogarty testified on behalf of his resolution at a closed hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Government leaders feared a repeat performance of his amendment to the foreign aid bill of the previous year. Upon direct questioning by Congressman Christian Herter (R-Mass.), Fogarty conceded that if his resolution were reported out of committee, he would personally desist from interfering with foreign aid earmarked for Great Britain. Congressional leaders
apparently took Fogarty at his word. The Fogarty Resolution was reported out of committee on August 14, 1951; the same day that a 7.8 billion dollar foreign aid bill was sent to the House. Approval of the Fogarty Resolution by the committee was reportedly an attempt to "keep the Irish partition question and foreign aid legislation apart." 37

Fogarty's resolution came to a vote on the House floor on September 27, 1951. Much to the surprise of Fogarty and other Irish-American leaders, it was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 206 to 139. 38 In all likelihood, the Administration expected its defeat and - despite the State Department's recommendation against its passage - it may have allowed it out of committee merely to dispose with it.

Fogarty was surprised by the suddenly vocal opposition with which his resolution was met. Until this point, the usual response by Congress to Fogarty's Irish initiatives had been to ignore them. Once Fogarty's bill had reached the House floor, however, it was met by a flurry of criticism by Southern Democrats and Republicans. Fogarty accused those who opposed it of attempting to "ridicule it into defeat." 39 In an emotional appeal on behalf of his resolution, he charged that those who would vote against it were "going to condone just what Great Britain did to the Irish back in 1918 if you refuse to consider honestly this resolution. You are condoning their police-state methods that exist today in the six-county area of Northern Ireland. You are condoning the methods there today that we as
Americans are decrying, day in and day out, all over the world, because we are against Stalin and communism. If you saw these police state methods in action, you would not recognize British rule. You would say that was rule under the Kremlin and under Stalin, because there is no difference."40 Despite its sponsor's heartfelt pleas, the Fogarty Resolution, faced with the adamant opposition of the Administration, was soundly defeated.

Fogarty was both surprised and disappointed by the defeat of his resolution. Yet despite the setback, he never relinquished his goal of obtaining the moral support of the United States government for the peaceful reunification of Ireland. Fogarty resubmitted his resolution with every new congressional term until his death in 1967. Its importance to him was signified by the fact that it was always the first resolution he submitted in each term.41 Fogarty pursued his goal of obtaining United States support for the peaceful reunification of Ireland through a number of maneuvers, but was ultimately unsuccessful.42 What made the Congressman from Rhode Island, despite the continued adamant opposition of government leaders, such an "unrelenting supporter of Irish reunification?"
Opponents of Fogarty's activities on behalf of the land of his forebears were virtually unanimous in attributing his pro-Irish activities to political posturing. His congressional colleagues, however, perceived a different motivation for his advocacy of the Irish cause. Shortly after Fogarty's death at the age of 53 in 1967, Congressman Edward Boland recalled that "[f]rom his first days in Congress he evidenced a rare perception of the ancient hopes and aspirations of Ireland and its people and demonstrated a firm determination to assist in properly promoting them." Forty years later, Eugene McCarthy reminisced that "Fogarty's main interest after health - possibly before it - was a United Ireland." Indeed, while he was not averse to advertising his efforts on behalf of Ireland to his fellow Irish-Americans at election time, John Fogarty's attachment to the Irish cause was more personal than political. His concern with Irish matters was largely determined by his family background and reinforced by the circumstances of the Irish community within which he was raised.
The grandson of Irish immigrants, John F. Fogarty was born in Providence on March 23, 1913. Although his family moved to rural Gloucester in 1919, the connection with Providence remained strong. When Fogarty was twelve years old his mother died. Yet the ties between the family members remained very close and his father, John P. Fogarty, exerted a powerful formative influence on his son's life. Young John attended public elementary school in Gloucester and attended high school at the Christian Brother's LaSalle Academy in Providence. Yet, according to David P. Doyle, a close friend and political associate of Congressman Fogarty, "travelling with his father was the greatest part of John's education."46

The intergenerational transmittal of Irish nationalist sentiment among Irish-American family members has been an important element in sustaining its force. Edward McSorley, author of Our Own Kind, a semi-autobiographical novel set in Providence, vividly depicted the process in one fictional early twentieth century Rhode Island working-class household. In that novel, Ned McDermott teaches his grandson Willie - the central character of the story - the final speech of the condemned Robert Emmet. Facing the vicissitudes of working-class life in an American industrial city, Ned and Willie McDermott find both solace and strength in the example of the Irish nationalist hero. "Bold Robert Emmet was their refuge, their well of courage."48 The spirit of Irish nationalism is constantly reinforced in
young Willie, as "time after time, as long as he could remember living with them, the old man had read to him word for word the imperishable damnation Emmet was hurling at the oppressors of his country there in the courtroom." The Irish nationalist martyr soon becomes as important a symbol for young Willie as he had been for his grandfather. This continued even after his grandfather's death, and "[m]any times...when disaster would threaten the boy's world he would think of those words and remember just how they had read them together so many many times. The old man and Emmet were forever his allies, sustaining him in many a lost battle, many bitter defeats."50

A similar transmittal of Irish nationalist sentiment was operative in the Fogarty household. John P. Fogarty was a bricklayer and a strong union man.51 He played an active role in the Irish-American nationalist movement of the post-World War I years, and he passed down his pride for his heritage to his children. Accordingly, "early in life - very, very early - he [John E. Fogarty] learned a love of things Irish."52

The interest of Fogarty's father in the plight of the homeland ensured that young John's education regarding Ireland would have a decidedly nationalist tinge. One of the first books that Fogarty's father suggested that he read was *Speeches From the Dock*.53 When the younger Fogarty read this collection of speeches by Irish nationalist martyrs, it "made a lasting impression on him."54 Fogarty
also absorbed similar sentiments from his father's friends and associates. Often accompanying his father to meetings of union, political and fraternal groups, Fogarty was "brought into contact with many who were intimately familiar with Irish history."\(^\text{55}\)

Fogarty's father was clearly the most important influence in informing and sustaining his interest in Irish nationalism. John P. Fogarty died in 1944, five years before his son would introduce his first resolution on Irish unification. Yet the Irish nationalist sentiment that he bequeathed to his son did not diminish over the years. Indeed this helps explain why Congressman Fogarty continued to pursue the goal of obtaining the support of the United States government for a united Ireland, despite the repeated rebuffs of Administration and congressional leaders. For John E. Fogarty, much like the fictional Willie McDermott, "the old man and Emmet were forever his allies, sustaining him in many lost battles, many bitter defeats."\(^\text{56}\)

Of course, interest in things Irish was not the only area in which John E. Fogarty emulated his father. He would follow his father in his initial choice of occupation and become a bricklayer, as well as an active member of the bricklayers' union.\(^\text{57}\) He also inherited his father's interest in politics. Involvement in each of these areas would have an impact on the development of Fogarty's Irish nationalism.

The elder Fogarty was active in Democratic ward
politics in Providence and would later run for town council in Glocester. His friends frequently visited the family farm on Sundays and discussed politics, and the Fogarty children were encouraged to join in such discussions. For Irish-Americans in Rhode Island in the early decades of the twentieth-century, interest in politics inevitably led to a more intense awareness of one's ethnicity.

Rhode Island in the early twentieth-century was seething with ethnocultural conflict. The Brahmin-led Yankee-based Republican party had ruled the state without interruption since the Civil War. By 1910 successive waves of immigration had left the state with the largest proportion of foreign stock residents in the country, with over 70% of Rhode Islanders being immigrants or their children. This development, combined with the fact that the large influx of immigrants had made Rhode Island the first and only state with a Catholic majority, created considerable unease among the state's residents of old-line Yankee stock.

The Republican machine, representing the interests of big business, gained the support of the state's rural voters by "staunchly defending the political and cultural hegemony of the Yankees against [the] new arrivals." Conversely, the Democrats sought to become the party of the foreign stock urban electorate. By the turn of the century the Irish-Americans had securely established themselves as the leaders of the Democratic party in Rhode Island.
Irish Democratic leaders vied with Republicans for the allegiance of the newer immigrant voters. Although the Irish often proved no more willing than did Republican Yankees to share positions of party leadership with members of other ethnic groups, their political activities were more than simply an exercise in group political power for its own sake. The Irish were in a position to help others while helping themselves. To a considerable degree, the Irish in Rhode Island shared similar cultural values and faced the same socioeconomic and political disabilities as the newer immigrant groups. A significant number of the Irish were still working-class. Most of those who had risen to middle-class status were still close enough to the working-class, both in years and in shared interests, to resent the continued social, economic, and political discrimination that was practiced against their "own kind".

Encouraged by the coincidence of interests between themselves and the newer immigrants, the Irish-led Democrats advocated a number of measures aimed at forwarding the interests of the working-class urban ethnic groups. They called for a more equitable political representation of such voters by championing both the liberalization of voting restrictions and the reapportionment of the grossly unrepresentative state senate. They supported direct primaries, the popular election of senators, and women's suffrage.

Democrats also offered an economic program that
quest for reform leadership was more than just an exercise and defending their cultural heritage. Thus, the Irish party opposed such legislation. They believed that immigration suppression and supported Sunday blue laws, lassoon-faire approached to economics, Republicans advocated initiatives offered a curious contrast to their

In the cultural sphere, Republicans opposed legislation in an attempt to placate some of versions of such proposals. In an attempt to placate some of opposed all such measures, or, at best, offered watered-down legislation. The state's Republican Party, on the other hand, generally endorsed a worker's compensation system, and increased wages and better working conditions for all workers. Called for laws limiting the working hours of women and anti-trust legislation, they were staunchly pro-labor and regulation of business, the establishment of a public, and economic sphere, the Democratic Party advocated state regulation and a working class based in another. In the was such tension between a capitalist class centered in one noted of Rhode Island, few are the states in which there culturalist overtones for, as one political scientist has

Republicans. Indeed, economic issues easily assumed contrasted sharply with that offered by the state's
in group self-interest. The Democratic Party advocated numerous measures aimed at bettering the lives of the largely working-class ethnic groups, and "by the second decade of the twentieth century, the Irish dominated Democrats emerged as the most consistent exponents of reform in Rhode Island, working for virtually all the recognizable progressive causes."69

In spite of this, the high percentage of foreign stock voters in Rhode Island had only nominally threatened the GOP's monopoly on political power. The Republicans managed to retain a stranglehold on state and local government largely through the combination of legislative malapportionment and franchise restrictions in local elections.70 In the state Senate, representation was by town and not by population. Thus in the 1920's the Town of West Greenwich, with a population of 481, had the same representation as the city of Providence, with 224,326 residents.71 This degree of malapportionment ensured that the twenty smallest towns, comprising only 7.5% of the state's population, could effectively control state government through their control of the assembly's upper chamber.72

Republican control of state government, in turn, guaranteed that that party would also control city government. This was effected through the General Assembly's power to modify the city's charter. As a result, "home rule was an unknown principle in Providence."73 The
increasingly foreign stock complexion of Providence's population ensured that Democrats would have a stranglehold on the office of Mayor by the early twentieth century. But state Republican leaders ensured that such a mayor was "virtually impotent" by stripping the office of its powers and vesting real control of the city's government in the city council. Republican control of the city council was guaranteed by the maintenance of a $134 property-tax-paying qualification for voting in councilmanic elections. This device ensured that nearly sixty percent of those who could vote for the virtually powerless office of mayor were disfranchised in the more meaningful city council elections. As one political scientist has observed, "[n]o state outside the South did so much to restrict the right to vote as did Rhode Island."

The Republican Party in Rhode Island also courted the votes of the newer immigrant groups. One means of doing this was the dispensation of patronage. The GOP's political control at the state and municipal level was "so complete that disadvantaged minorities had to look to them for almost all political favors." Another useful tool in attracting immigrant votes was the use of 'recognition politics'. After stripping the office of governor of most of its power by the passage of 'Brayton's Law' in 1901, which "gave the gerrymandered legislature virtual independence from the popularly elected governor", the Republicans wooed the allegiance of many French-Canadian
voters by nominating French-Canadian candidates for that virtually powerless office. 79

The darker skins, foreign languages, distinctive dress, and different cultural values of the New Immigrants worried many natives of Anglo-Saxon lineage. Yet, since the Republicans sought the support of the newer immigrant voters, they could scarcely afford to offend them.

The Irish, however, because they had long been committed to the Democratic Party, offered a more convenient target. As the first of the sizable immigrant groups to disrupt the Anglo-American ethnic homogeneity of the state, the Irish were the first to be seen as a threat to the established order. Discrimination against them continued into the twentieth century, as "the old Yankees found it difficult to overcome their prejudice against foreigners" and "most of the Irish, French-Canadians, and Italians were seen as racially inferior to the Anglo-Saxons - at least, by the best social scientists of the day and the informed public." 80

Such prejudice presented an imposing obstacle to the economic and social advancement of immigrant groups in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Rhode Island. Indeed the effects of this prejudice were so overwhelming that many of the Irish turned to politics as one of the few viable alternatives for seeking individual and group advancement. The Irish first encountered American politics with better preparation than most other immigrant groups, because their
experience in Ireland had equipped them with both a grasp of the English language and a knowledge of the complexities of the Anglo-Saxon political system. By the turn of the century, Irish-Americans were becoming increasingly aggressive in their attempts to play a leading role in Rhode Island public life through politics.

The increasing visibility and success of the Irish in Rhode Island politics unnerved many Rhode Islanders. The Catholicism of the Irish and their aspirations to political leadership of the newer immigrant groups ensured that Rhode Islanders of native stock would continue to be wary of them. One Brown University political scientist complained in 1909 that "the growing numbers of the Irish have contributed their share to local instability, and accentuated certain social prejudices of a grave sort." Their role as the first ethnic group to challenge the Yankee elite's control of the state and their continued attempts to wrest a share of political power ensured that Rhode Islanders of Anglo-Saxon lineage would hold a special animus towards the Irish. This hostility was recorded by Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr., the great-grandson of Nelson W. Aldrich, the Republican United States Senator from Rhode Island from 1881-1911 who has been characterized as "the personification of the old Republican machine." Aldrich recounts that his grandfather, the son of the Senator, "loathed the Irish. The children of any other ethnic group - Jewish, Italian, German, blacks...my grandfather was more than happy to
consider for friendship...but not the Irish."84 Clearly, despite their deepening roots in American society, the Irish of Rhode Island were "still aliens to the Yankees."85

In the early decades of the twentieth century, Irish Democrats attempted to forge a coalition with the newer immigrant groups for the purpose eliminating the inequities of the state electoral system and enacting social welfare legislation. Although a shared Catholicism had not yet made for an immigrant political consensus, many of the state's Protestants feared such an eventuality. Irish leadership in the political arena was viewed as a serious threat by native stock Republicans. If the Democrats were successful in forming a coalition of ethnic groups, it would signal not only the advent of the Irish to political power, but also the dominance of the urban immigrants' cultural values. Unlike criticism of the newer immigrants, however, attacks against the Irish would hardly cost the Republicans any support since, as one political historian has observed, "[i]n Rhode Island they [the Irish] were virtually unanimous in their commitment to the Democracy."86 As a result, the Irish, as the leaders of the insurgent forces, often bore the brunt of the attack from those who wished to preserve the status quo.

The Irish themselves were experiencing significant socioeconomic mobility during these years.87 While there was considerable group solidarity, the Irish were no longer
as self-contained as in earlier years or as many of the newer immigrant groups were in the early twentieth century. Increasing contacts with the old-stock Anglo-American community might lead to increasing assimilation, but it could also multiply the number of possible points of friction. One such point of friction which developed between the Irish-Americans of Rhode Island and those of Anglo-Saxon stock was over Irish-American nationalism.

Irish-American nationalism had long been a potent force within the Irish-American community in Rhode Island. A Saint Patrick's Day parade in the state in 1893 had a powerful effect on one Irish immigrant bricklayer. As Batt O'Connor recalled more than thirty years later, "In the second year I was in America I saw a St. Patrick's Day parade in Providence, Rhode Island. I walked in that procession, and in the emotion I felt, walking as one of that vast crowd of Irish emigrants celebrating our national festival, I awoke to the full consciousness of my love for my country." This realization ultimately inspired O'Connor to return to Ireland where he participated in the Easter Rising and the Anglo-Irish War. Although Batt O'Connor's Irish nationalist sentiments may have been commonplace among Irish immigrants, his response was exceptional. Relatively few Irish immigrants permanently returned to Ireland. Most remained in America and attempted to express their Irish nationalist sentiments through American institutions.
As in most urban northeast states, Irish-American nationalism was a much more powerful force in Rhode Island in the years from 1916-1923 than it had been during O'Connor's sojourn there. The Irish-American community had never been as vocal or seemed as powerful as in their advocacy of Ireland's cause during these years. A number of new organizations were formed to encourage the use of American influence to help Ireland achieve freedom. Prodigious amounts of money were raised and mass meetings of up to 25,000 people urged Rhode Island politicians to aid the cause. A young John Fogarty was no doubt powerfully affected by this atmosphere, as his father was quite active in the movement and helped to establish one of the local branches of the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic.

Rhode Island Irish-Americans had considerable success in influencing local politicians to proclaim their support for Irish freedom. Their efforts even had an impact on the national level when they helped to convince Democratic Senator Peter Goelet Gerry to add the fifteenth reservation - supporting Ireland's claim to self-determination - to the Versailles Treaty. The Irish also reached beyond their own ethnic enclave to try to enlist the support of all Rhode Islanders, including the Yankee community.

The specter of such a thoroughly mobilized Irish-American community, however, disconcerted many Rhode Islanders of native stock. As early as 1909, Brown
University political scientist William McDonald had expressed concern about the connection between Irish-American nationalism and Irish-American political behavior in Rhode Island. In Professor McDonald's opinion the effect of the former on the latter was undoubtedly deleterious. "The unfortunate historical environment of the race in its native land, and the systematic representation of Great Britain as a copious source of injustice and oppression," he condescendingly opined, "have unquestionably helped to retard in certain elements of the Irish people that distinctive regard for government, law, and order which characterizes the highest Anglo-Saxon civilization."93

Such sentiment was not confined to the academic elite. In the years after World War I, the almost daily succession of mass meetings and the successive fund drives by which Irish-Americans aggressively sought American support for Irish freedom, led many Rhode Islanders of Anglo-Saxon stock to draw similar conclusions. Irish-American success in gaining political support for Ireland's freedom - a goal towards which most native Rhode Islanders were either indifferent or antagonistic - resulted in an increased fear of Irish-American political power. The politicians whom they swayed were criticized for their "disgusting pandering" and for showing "a shameful sensitiveness to the so-called Irish-American vote."94

Ethnocultural conflict in Rhode Island became as apparent over the issue of Irish nationalism as it was over
domestic and local issues, and in many ways the former was an extension of the latter. The state's Irish-American nationalists found themselves under attack at home for their advocacy of Ireland's cause.

Opposition to Irish-American nationalism in Rhode Island received considerable impetus from John R. Rathom and the Providence Journal. Rathom, the Australian-born managing editor of that organ, has been characterized by historians as a "flamboyant liar" whose anti-German and anti-Bolshevik editorial excesses "promoted a climate of hysteria" within the state. He employed both of these themes in an effort to discredit the state's Irish. Irish-American nationalists occupied a prominent place among Rathom's targets as he made the editorial pages of the Providence Journal the focal point for opposition to Irish nationalism in Rhode Island.

Irish-American nationalists saw no contradiction between being advocates of a free Ireland and being loyal Americans. Indeed they had long used American republican ideology to justify Ireland's freedom from British rule. Rathom, however, an ardent Angophile and a loyal son of the empire, had long evinced disagreement with Irish nationalism. As soon as the United States entered the First World War, he sought to discredit Irish-American nationalists by impugning their loyalty. Rathom unleashed the force of the wartime anti-German hysteria against Irish-American nationalists in the state by labelling them
as "insidious agitators" and "traitors in Rhode Island." Anti-German feeling did not end with the Armistice, and nearly two years after the war had ended Rathom continued to enflame Anglo-American resentment against Irish-American nationalists by depicting them as a "despicable hyphenated element that did its utmost to bring about a German triumph." Anti-Bolshevism soon superseded anti-Germanism as the primary component of 100% Americanism in the postwar years, resulting in the Red Scare. Rathom's strategy for discrediting Irish-American nationalists evolved accordingly, as he attempted to exploit Rhode Islanders fears of Bolshevism by channeling it against Irish nationalists. The editorial pages of the Providence Journal asserted that "the rebellion in Ireland is part and parcel of the Moscow movement for the overthrow of the organized 'bourgeois' Governments of the world. Helping the 'Irish Republic' not only contributes to the embarassment of the British Government but adds fuel to the flames that the would-be-destroyers of modern civilization are endeavoring to spread everywhere." Rathom also attempted to turn the combined emotive force of anti-Germanism and anti-Bolshevism against Irish-American nationalists, by implicating them in a supposed German and Bolshevik conspiracy to overturn the world order. In June of 1921 the Providence Journal declared that "the hyphenated activities in America today...
are of a piece with the abominable campaign of the German hyphenates during the World War. Indeed there is at the present moment, as there has been in the past, a direct connection between the American movement for Irish 'freedom' and the German plot for the overthrow of the British Empire -- a plot linked up with the Bolshevik campaign to the same end....A reckless international partnership has been established that desires the destruction of modern civilization in its existing form... what seems at first glance to be an isolated movement on the part of the Irish extremists to free themselves of the 'shackles' of English 'tyranny' is really one phase of a world-wide conspiracy which must have no shelter on American soil."

Thus the ethnocultural conflict between the Irish and Anglo-Saxon peoples of Rhode Island was significantly exacerbated as the former, already resented for trying to upset the status quo at home, were indicted by the state's leading newspaper as a menace to the status quo abroad.

The fact that ethnic conflict arose over the question of Irish freedom led Rhode Island's Irish-Americans to see close parallels between the situation in Ireland and the situation in Rhode Island. Although the Irish-American
nationalists had enjoyed much success in swaying even Republican politicians to make at least token statements supporting Ireland's freedom, they realized that it was the traditional supporters of the Republican Party within the state who had been the most vehement opponents of their efforts. Just as the 'campaign to make the world safe for democracy' had done little to help Ireland gain her freedom, it had done little to eliminate the suffrage restrictions in Rhode Island. Irish nationalist leaders stressed the direct connection between the fight for Irish freedom and the fight for the extension of equal rights at home.

During the 1920 Presidential election most Irish-Americans in Rhode Island and throughout the United States departed from their usual voting patterns by opposing the Democratic candidate James Cox. Irish voters resented Cox's support for the League of Nations, a body which most of the Irish viewed as a tool of British hegemony. But Irish nationalist leaders in Rhode Island were careful to differentiate between Cox's candidacy and that of Democratic candidates at the local level. While opposing the Democratic candidate for president because of his support for the League of Nations, one of the state's leading Irish-American nationalists stressed that "the same standard of political morality which justifies the rejection of Governor Cox also demands the defeat of the Republicans in this state on State or Municipal issues. The State Republican organization is primarily responsible for the
perpetuation of the iniquitous property qualification as well as the disproportional power of the decadent towns in the State Senate." 102 After the Anglo-Irish Treaty granted a degree of independence to Ireland, the Rhode Island Irish, disillusioned by the ensuing Irish Civil War, turned their attention to extending democracy within the state.

In the 1920's Rhode Island's Irish-led Democrats redoubled their efforts to obtain their progressive goals. Fundamental to their success would be the elimination of local franchise restrictions and a reapportionment of the rotten-borough state senate. The property qualification for voting in city council elections in Providence still disfranchised almost 60% of the registry voters from city council elections. At the same time, the malapportionment of the state senate made that body, according to one contemporary political scientist, "the most undemocratic and unrepublican legislative organization in the United States." 103

Ethnocultural and religious differences remained at the core of the conflict being waged on the political battlefield. As in other parts of the country, opposing attitudes towards prohibition, immigration restriction, and Sunday blue laws became issues of powerful symbolic value. 104 As the state's Protestant Republicans had tried to legislate conformity to their moral code on these matters, they now feared that Rhode Island's Catholics could
use their increasing numbers to reverse this and impose Catholic values on the state's Protestant population. Since 1905 the Rhode Island populace had been predominantly Catholic. Only the legislative legerdemain of the Republican machine would ensure that political power remained firmly in Protestant hands for three more decades. As the state's population became increasingly more Catholic, voting restrictions and malapportionment became the last redoubt for some Protestants against the feared possibility of a Catholic-run state.

One manifestation of Protestant fears of Catholic power in Rhode Island in the 1920's was the appearance of the Ku Klux Klan within the state. Inspired by the 100% Americanism that flourished during and after World War I, the Klan offered one recourse for those who feared the rising numbers and growing influence of the foreign stock Catholics within the state. While troubled by the religious and cultural mores of these newcomers, the Klansmen seemed especially fearful that such values might be legitimized by the coming to power of foreign stock voters. Given the ethnic make-up of the two political parties within the state, the Klan in Rhode Island was primarily a Republican phenomenon.

The Rhode Island Klan found adherents both in rural areas and within the city of Providence. The organization's success in recruiting members from both areas suggests how integral the fear of loss of political power
was to its success. The urban immigrant Democratic efforts to remove the property qualification for voting naturally fueled the fears of the city's Protestant population, while their attempts to remedy the malapportionment within the state senate threatened to undermine the power of the state's predominantly Protestant rural inhabitants.

Again, the Irish, as the leaders of the political forces trying to undermine Protestant-Republican control, came most often under attack. Rhode Islanders of native stock had long feared the accession of the Irish to political power. As early as the 1850's the Providence Journal had editorialized against the loosening of suffrage restrictions, claiming that universal male suffrage would lead to a situation in which "Rhode Island will no longer be Rhode Island...It will become a province of Ireland. St. Patrick will take the place of Roger Williams, and the shamrock will supersede the anchor and hope."108 Now the Irish were feared not only for themselves, but also as the potential leaders of all the Catholic foreign born. Irish success in politics was equated with the ascendance of the cultural and religious values of the groups that they hoped to represent.

Accordingly, Klan literature within the state singled out the Irish, in their leadership role, for the most criticism. In a specifically religious vein, Klan publicists criticized "the Latin Church o'erruled in America by Irish clericals."109 Yet the Klan seemed most upset at
the Irish role in politics, excoriating "the Catholic Irish" politicians, under whose auspices "the big 'foreign vote' is corralled to sweep all voters of Anglo-Saxon lineage into the discard." Klansmen warned that a unified Catholic electorate would lead to a "deplorable and fateful" situation in which "the rulers [would] be Catholic in faith and manners." Overall, Klan spokesmen concluded that "the Irish-American Catholics are the most illiberal, petulant, trouble-brewing class which go to make up the nation's population."

Political developments during the decade only increased such antipathy. During the 1924 session of the Rhode Island State Senate, Democratic senators employed filibustering and other obstructive tactics in an attempt to force action on a constitutional convention - a mechanism through which they hoped to lift franchise restrictions and rectify malapportionment. As described by one historian of suffrage in Rhode Island, "extremist Democrats launched a campaign to paralyze the legislative process, like that of the Irish Home Rulers in the British House of Commons."

Republican leaders, fearing that the Democratic filibustering was about to succeed, turned to extralegal maneuvering in order to circumvent their opponents strategy. They hired a hoodlum from Boston to set off a bromine gas bomb on the senate floor, forcing the evacuation of that chamber. In the ensuing chaos the Republican senators, accompanied by a bodyguard of Klansmen, fled the state and
refused to return until the senate session ended six months later. Their absence deprived the state senate of a quorum, and thus ensured that Democratic efforts to call a constitutional convention would fail.

Despite the culpability of Republican leaders for the bomb incident, the public held the Democrats responsible for the chaos in state government. Nativists preferred to place the blame on the Irish element of the Democratic Party. Partisans of the Klan referred to events in the statehouse as "the disgraceful scrapping of Kilkenny Cats." Later that year, the Klan burned two crosses in front of the home of the leading Democratic filibusterer, the aptly named State Senator Robert Emmet Quinn.

Four years later, with Irish Catholic Al Smith running as the Democratic candidate for President, ethno-religious tensions again ran high in Rhode Island. Democratic efforts to remove franchise restrictions in city elections were about to reach fruition. This would signal the inevitable accession to power of Irish-American politicians. Fears of such an outcome triggered some extreme responses among city residents of Anglo-American stock. In the city of Providence, it was discovered that three entire companies of the state militia had been taken over by the Ku Klux Klan.

That same year, in rural Glocester, a fifteen year old John E. Fogarty experienced what it felt like to be the target of religious intolerance when the Klan burned a cross
on the Fogarty family farm. As the impending depression would soon prove, the move to rural Rhode Island would help cushion the impact of hard economic times on the Fogarty family. Despite being out of work for months at a time during the midst of the depression, life on the farm helped to ensure that there was always food on the table. While rural life provided a measure of economic security, however, the social effects of the move to the overwhelmingly Protestant and Yankee Glocester were not always as benign. The Fogartys were one of the only Catholic families in the area. The local Catholic church, over three miles away, was still considered a mission church. There were so few Catholics in the vicinity that there were rarely more than twenty people at the weekly mass. Thus the move for economic security entailed a certain degree of ethnocultural isolation, as became glaringly evident in the cross-burning incident. The traumatic effect of this Klan action must have been intensified by the fact that the Fogarty family encountered the flaming cross upon their return from a function at which they had been celebrating their contribution to the local community. Ironically, that occasion was a dinner of the local volunteer firemen.

The activities of the Klan, however, were more a last gasp effort against the inevitable accession to power of the foreign stock politicians than an effective means of preventing it. In 1928 the property qualification for
voting in city elections was eliminated. In the next election in 1930, the Democrats finally came to power in Providence. As a result, the Irish of Providence finally gained positions of political power proportionate to their numbers and status. Democratic strength was further solidified by the depression and the resulting election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. Finally, in 1935, the Democrats gained political control of the state as a result of the 1934 elections and the ensuing 'Bloodless Revolution'. Engineered by Lieutenant Governor Robert Emmet Quinn, Thomas P. McCoy of Pawtucket, and Governor Theodore Francis Greene, the 'Bloodless Revolution' "toppled Yankee political power in the state and marked the definite ascendancy of the Irish" to political power.

Despite his young age, John E. Fogarty, as schooled by his father, was very politically aware during these years. He closely followed the efforts of Rhode Island's Democrats to ensure the increased participation of working-class ethnic voters by overturning the inequities of the state's political system. As a result, he was well aware that the prejudices of the ruling class, when institutionalized by the political structure of the state through the employment of gerrymandering and franchise restrictions, could have a powerful effect in retarding the advancement of other groups. This impressed upon Fogarty the fact that the effects of gerrymandering and franchise restrictions were very real. Years later he would recall that "[t]he so-called
Yankee families had little or no contact with other groups. Until 1928, when Rhode Island's property restriction on the right to vote was repealed, most of the political power in this state was in the hands of the descendants of the earlier English settlers. They controlled much of the economic and professional life as well."125

Fogarty became active in local politics before he was even old enough to vote. In 1931, at the age of eighteen, he helped to organize the first Democratic Club in the town of Gloucester. Three years later, he became an active member of the Town Democratic Committee.126 Gloucester, of course, would remain under Republican control for many years to come. Yet Fogarty's involvement in Democratic politics in Rhode Island during the period when that party would finally achieve success after over seventy years of battling against seemingly insurmountable odds, no doubt helped to instill in him an appreciation of the possibilities of political action.

The depression, however, ensured that most of Fogarty's energies during these years would be devoted to earning a living. Shortly after graduation from high school he started working as an apprentice bricklayer. Four years later he earned his master bricklayer's certificate. He experienced seasonal unemployment during the 1930's and, on occasion, had to travel as far as New Jersey to obtain work.127 Readily identifying with the vagaries and
uncertainties of the life of the laboring man, Fogarty's roots remained solidly working-class. The depression helped to instill in him both an awareness of social injustice and a determination to do something about it. In 1936 Fogarty combined his political and labor interests by seeking and winning the office of President of the Bricklayers and Masons Union, Local No. 1 of Rhode Island.

The depression had a similar effect on most Irish-Americans in Rhode Island as it had on Fogarty. Some nationalist sentiment, consisting of a pride in Ireland and a concern over the continued partition of that country, had lingered on after the Irish Civil War. This had been reinforced somewhat by an infusion of Irish Republicans after their defeat in that conflict. The hard economic times of the late 1920's and early 1930's, however, forced most Irish-Americans to concentrate on bread and butter issues. As a result, many of the Irish social and cultural organizations that had lingered on after the nationalist ferment of the early 1920's were forced to disband.

Rhode Island's Irish-Americans, however, still congregated in less formally Irish organizations, and at times shared in talk about the homeland. One such type of organization - indeed, one which was galvanized rather than weakened by the depression - was the union. Ethnic identity has often been expressed through unions, and trade unions had long been a hotbed of Irish-American nationalism.
Experience with English exploitation in Ireland had sensitized Irish-American laborers to capitalist exploitation of workers. As a result, Irish-American nationalism and working-class protest were often mutually reinforcing.¹³²

Historian Eric Foner has described the Rhode Island of the 1880's as one area where "a symbiotic relationship between class-conscious unionism and Irish national consciousness" existed.¹³³ He also posits that the link between trade union activism and Irish nationalism continued in existence long after the break up of the Land League in the late nineteenth century.¹³⁴ If the continued oppression of both labor and Ireland helped to sustain such a connection, perhaps that link lasted especially long in Rhode Island, where any significant pro-labor legislation had to await the accession of the Democrats to power in the mid-1930's.

If Fogarty's experience is any indication, the symbiotic relationship between working class activism and Irish nationalism, although perhaps somewhat attenuated over the intervening years, was still a powerful one in the Rhode Island of the 1930's. The bricklayers' union of which Fogarty became president had a significant number of Irish members and "at meetings of union men and women he met many people genuinely proud of their Irish ancestry and genuinely interested in the cause of Ireland's complete freedom."¹³⁵ Although Ireland was far from a preoccupying issue for
Fogarty during these years, his union activities did reinforce the Irish nationalism instilled in him by his father.

Fogarty's union associations were especially useful in supplementing his own Irish nationalist sentiments during a period when the traditional mainstays of such beliefs - the Irish-American fraternal organizations - were in disarray. The creation of Eire in 1937 sparked a reawakening among Irish-Americans of a pride in Ireland. This, when combined with improving economic conditions, led to a renaissance of Irish-American organizations in Rhode Island. These groups were primarily social and cultural in nature. Yet their leaders, many of whom had emigrated during the 1920's, evinced a keen interest in the welfare of Ireland and a continuing concern over the partition of that island. The fact that the beginning of Fogarty's political career coincided with the revival of a more organized interest in Irish affairs within Rhode Island, no doubt heightened his already inbred sensitivity to Irish issues.
CONCLUSION

Given his background, it is not surprising that John E. Fogarty would become the leading Congressional proponent of Irish nationalism of his generation. The primary source of his interest in Ireland's welfare was undoubtedly his family background. Indeed Fogarty himself suggested that his Irish nationalism was a virtually inbred phenomenon. When queried as to when he first became interested in Ireland, he responded that "if you're of Irish extraction you don't get interested in Ireland, you're born that way!"137 Although Fogarty's parents were born in the United States, his grandparents were all born in Ireland. In Fogarty's estimation, "that's enough for me. You never break the tie."138 The Fogarty family was intensely proud of its Irish heritage. Fogarty's father had been an active Irish-American nationalist, and the future Congressman eagerly imbibed the nationalist sentiments of his father.

His father's influence also affected Fogarty's Irish nationalism in less direct ways. It was largely through his father that Fogarty was introduced to the larger world of the Irish-American community in Rhode Island, in all of its facets. Fogarty's father introduced him to politics and to union activity as well as Irish nationalism. These were seldom treated as three discrete spheres of activity among Rhode Island's Irish during the first half of the twentieth century. Given the highly polarized nature of Rhode Island
society during these years, ethnocultural, political, and economic factors were, to a considerable extent, reinforcing agencies. Involvement in one area usually entailed at least an active interest in the others.

As a congressman, John E. Fogarty, described by one Rhode Island political scientist as "labor's pride," remained fiercely loyal to his working-class origins and constituents. In 1958, when one congressman attempted to ridicule one of his legislative initiatives into defeat by derogatorily referring to Fogarty's bricklayer background, Fogarty responded by reaffirming his pride in his working-class origins. Although he had to relinquish the presidency of the bricklayers union when he was elected to Congress, he retained his union membership and often proudly displayed his membership card. Ethnic identity has often been expressed through labor unions, and the bricklayers union that Fogarty had belonged to and become president of had a large number of Irish-American members. Fogarty's working-class sensibilities ensured that he would remain responsive to working-class concerns. Fealty to Ireland was one of those concerns.

An additional source of Fogarty's Irish nationalism, one which was unique to the Irish of Rhode Island during this time period, was the recent political history of the state. In some respects, Fogarty's motivation for pursuing a united Ireland was indeed political. During the course of his tenure in the House of Representatives, Irish-Americans
dominated the Rhode Island Democratic party which, in turn, dominated state government. It would have been logical for Fogarty to assume that such people would naturally respond favorably to his united Ireland initiative. At the very least, Fogarty could be assured that he could pursue his own deeply held Irish initiative without much opposition from government leaders within the state.

By the same token, however, it is unlikely that many of the Rhode Island Irish would have voted against Fogarty had he not forwarded and repeatedly submitted his resolution on Irish unification. Being Irish, Democratic, and pro-labor meant that Fogarty probably could have been assured of reelection without actively campaigning for a united Ireland. He did not have to take the initiative, but could have played it safe by simply mouthing traditional united Ireland slogans during St. Patrick's Day speeches, as did most other Irish-American politicians.

Yet the political connotations of being raised an Irish Catholic Democrat in early twentieth century Rhode Island also had a deeper significance. Fogarty came from a tradition which was keenly aware of the effects of social, political, religious, and economic discrimination. As a youth, he experienced what it was like to be the victim of religious intolerance. Fogarty grew up in a state in which a predominantly Protestant Republican party, led by the state's monied interests, used gerrymandering and disfranchisement in order to deny power to a primarily
Catholic Irish-led Democratic party that represented working-class interests.

In contrast to the situation in Massachusetts and New York, the barriers erected to prevent the Irish from achieving political power in Rhode Island proved effective until the 1930's. Thus, while some of his congressional colleagues may have faced anti-Irish prejudice in the attitudes of others, Fogarty grew up in a state where such prejudices were institutionalized by the political structure of the state. The memories of such discrimination and its effects were still fresh in the minds of the Rhode Island Irish at mid-century. Indeed, as late as two years after Fogarty's death, one political scientist who investigated the political situation in Rhode Island reported that "the wounds of ethnic discrimination and hard economic times are still fresh." As a result, even in 1969, the Rhode Island Democratic party remained "the beneficiary of the memories - living memories - of Republican discrimination against the newcomers and their children."

In Rhode Island the Democratic party had traditionally been the party of reform, and its Irish leaders had consistently supported the extension of the franchise and better living and working conditions for the working-class. As an heir to this tradition, Fogarty was a staunch proponent of government playing an active role in advancing the welfare of the people. When elected to the House of Representatives, Fogarty brought this philosophy with him to
national government. His united Ireland proposals were an attempt to apply it on the international scene. In a sense, his fight against partition can be viewed as a natural extension of the fight for equal rights at home that the Rhode Island Irish had been pursuing for generations.

The franchise restrictions, gerrymandering, and religious intolerance that the Rhode Island Irish experienced during his youth were not dominating memories for Fogarty during his tenure in Congress. The triumph of the Democrats in the state during the 1930's assured the elimination of most of the institutionalized injustices, if not the social prejudice. Yet when the Irish government launched its anti-partition campaign in the late 1940's, Fogarty's Rhode Island experience left him uniquely prepared to be receptive to such a call. A major part of Ireland's call for unification stressed the evil effects of the franchise restrictions, gerrymandering, and religious intolerance suffered by Northern Ireland's Catholic population. Many Americans were unaware of the existence of such conditions in Northern Ireland. Others could not appreciate the magnitude of the effects of such conditions. Even some Irish-American nationalists recited them merely as perfunctory slogans, hopefully useful in advancing the goal of a united Ireland.

Such arguments, however were more meaningful to Fogarty. Although conditions in Rhode Island in the early twentieth century were by no means identical to those in
Northern Ireland in 1950, there were enough parallels so that Fogarty could analogize from the Rhode Island of his youth to Northern Ireland at mid-century. These memories were strong enough to make Fogarty acutely aware that the effects of the restricted franchise, gerrymandering, and religious and economic discrimination suffered by the Catholic population in Northern Ireland were very real. Considering his own and the larger Irish-American experience in Rhode Island during the first third of the twentieth century, it is little wonder that Fogarty could be described by one Rhode Island historian as "a throwback to the Irish congressmen of the early twentieth century in his outspoken advocacy of Ireland's cause."145

Towards the end of his life, Fogarty - given the constant rebuffs that his Irish initiatives endured and the fact that the border remained firmly entrenched - minimized the impact of his efforts. In 1965 he observed that "we never had any success, but we brought it to the attention of the world on two or three occasions."146 Fogarty's impact on the nationalism of the Irish-American community, however, was more substantial. According to one Irish-American leader who was involved in garnering support for the Fogarty resolution, "the purpose of the campaign had been to raise the consciousness level of Irish-Americans about the situation in the homeland and to try to change it. At the end of the campaign there was little change in Ireland, but
we had succeeded in keeping the issue alive in the United States."147 Indeed, merely 'keeping the issue alive' was a notable achievement in the face of the adamant opposition of the United States government and the rapidly advancing assimilation of the Irish-American community. Perhaps that is why Sean McBride, Ireland's Minister of External Affairs from 1948 to 1951, remarked in a 1984 interview that "John Fogarty...did marvelous work."148

The defeat of the Fogarty Resolution signalled the effective close of the heyday of post-World War II Irish-American nationalism. One of the arguments stressed by Fogarty and his colleagues during the anti-partition drive was that "the Stormont government was sowing seeds of violence that would flower in later years."149 Fogarty pleaded with the State Department to use its influence with the British to effect a solution to the partition problem, urging that "the time to remedy this condition is in advance of gunplay or other strife."150 Such arguments seemed prophetic in 1968, when violence against Catholics in Northern Ireland would create chaos and lead to the resurrection of the Irish Republican Army. Ironically, Fogarty died in 1967, a year before events in Northern Ireland and their broadcast to the United States by television would reveal to many Americans the substantial veracity of his charges. This would galvanize a significant section of the Irish-American community to again turn to Irish nationalism. Had he lived longer, Fogarty undoubtedly
would have again offered his resolution as an appropriate
vehicle of response for those Irish-Americans interested in
encouraging a peaceful solution to the problem. Without
such an option, many chose to help subsidize a more violent
alternative.
NOTES


4. Polenberg, 139-150.


7. ibid.

8. John E. Fogarty, speech delivered to the American Friends of Irish Neutrality, New York, November 23, 1941. Fogarty Papers, Providence College Archives, Providence, Rhode Island.

9. 28 June 1949, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 95, 8572.


15. 25 July 1949, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., vol. 95, 10125.


18. 29 March 1950, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 96, 4344.

19. ibid.

20. ibid.

21. ibid., 4348.


23. 29 March 1950, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 96, 4344.

24. 31 March 1950, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 96, 4551.


29. ibid.


33. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Unity of Ireland. 81st Congress, 2nd session, 28 April 1950, 1-140.

34. 20 September 1950, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 96, 15330.


38. 27 September 1951, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., vol. 97, 12287.

39. ibid., 12285.

40. ibid.

41. Matthew J. Smith, comp., An Inventory of the Papers of John E. Fogarty, (Providence: Providence College, 1970), 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 32, 38, 45, 54.

42. In 1953, with his resolution on Irish unity again buried in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Fogarty filed a discharge petition in an attempt to bring the resolution directly before the House for a vote. See Providence Evening Bulletin, 21 May 1953. In 1954, Fogarty led a delegation of Congressmen in talks with Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in an effort to enlist the aid of the State Department in addressing the partition problem. See John E. Fogarty to John Foster Dulles, 22 April 1955, Fogarty Papers.

43. 16 March 1967, Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 113, 6959.

44. McCarthy, 20.


46. In 1955, George Potter, who was writing a history of Irish-Americans, asked Congressman Fogarty for information on the source of his interest in a united Ireland. George Kelley, Fogarty's administrative assistant at that time, asked Fogarty's former administrative assistant and close friend, David P. Doyle, to draft a report on the subject for Potter. Doyle, a lawyer, had worked on Fogarty's first campaign for the House and served as his assistant in Washington from 1941 to 1948. A copy of his report is included in Kelley's response to Potter. See George J. Kelley to George W. Potter, 1 April 1955, Fogarty Papers. Cited hereafter as Doyle report.


49. ibid., 5.

50. ibid., 14.

51. Healey, 40.

52. Doyle report.

53. ibid.

54. ibid.

55. ibid.

56. McSorley, 14.

57. Healey, 40.

58. ibid., 36.


66. ibid., 50.

67. ibid., 48-50.


69. ibid.


72. ibid.


74. ibid.


78. ibid., 232.


83. Peirce, 156.


87. Daoust, 24-27.


89. ibid., 14-15.

90. *Providence Visitor*, 16 September 1921.

91. Doyle report.

93. McDonald, 50.


101. Carroll, 139-148.


111. Rhode Island Pendulum, 19 June 1924.

112. Rhode Island Pendulum, 3 July 1924.


116. Rhode Island Pendulum, 3 July 1924.


119. Healey, 38.

120. ibid., 37.


122. ibid.


125. John E. Fogarty, Speech delivered to the Theta Chapter of Delta Epsilon Sigma, National Catholic Honor Society, Providence College. Fogarty Papers.


127. Healey, 50.


129. Healey, 40.

130. Providence Visitor, 1922 to 1935, passim.

131. Miller, 524.


134. ibid., 45.

135. Doyle report.


137. Truden, 9.

138. ibid.


141. Healey, 40.


143. ibid.


147. O'Dwyer, 176.


149. O'Dwyer, 176.
150. 20 September 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 96, 15330.